11 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
| 16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
| 12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
| 16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
| 19423 | By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think [Leibniz] |