31 ideas
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |