Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reference and Generality (3rd ed)', 'Isolation and Non-arbitrary Division' and 'Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
13917 Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
17435 Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17433 We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki]
17439 There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
12154 Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
17434 We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
17436 We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
8969 We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
13918 Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13922 Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
16075 Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
12152 Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16073 Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]