18 ideas
21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |