10 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |