12 ideas
| 12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
| 14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
| 14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
| 14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
| 22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
| 14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |