Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'Function and Concept'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]