11 ideas
12302 | Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K] |
14266 | Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K] |
9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
14268 | Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K] |
14267 | There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K] |
14264 | Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
14265 | The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K] |