13 ideas
| 14263 | Strong Kleene disjunction just needs one true disjunct; Weak needs the other to have some value [Fine,K] |
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 14262 | Formal grounding needs transitivity of grounding, no self-grounding, and the existence of both parties [Fine,K] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
| 19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
| 7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
| 19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
| 11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |