14 ideas
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
1212 | Replacing timbers on Theseus' ship was the classic illustration of the problem of growth and change [Plutarch] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |