18 ideas
13931 | By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger] |
13925 | Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
13924 | The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger] |
13930 | Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger] |
13927 | We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger] |
13928 | If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
13929 | Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger] |
13926 | Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |