Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'Outlines of Pyrrhonism' and 'From Metaphysics to Ethics'

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65 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story [Jackson]
Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis [Jackson]
Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Jackson, by Schroeter]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account [Jackson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
Truth supervenes on being [Jackson]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 7. Paradoxes of Time
Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level [Jackson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans [Jackson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties [Jackson]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus]
The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus]
The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus]
If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus]
Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus]
If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus]
Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus]
If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus]
With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori? [Jackson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output [Jackson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water' [Jackson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / c. Classical concepts
Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Successful predication supervenes on nature [Jackson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions [Jackson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality [Jackson]
Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide [Jackson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus]
Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus]
Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus]
If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / d. Natural Evil
If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus]