36 ideas
| 19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
| 18996 | A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts [Yablo] |
| 19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
| 19006 | An 'enthymeme' is an argument with an indispensable unstated assumption [Yablo] |
| 19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
| 19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
| 18999 | y is only a proper part of x if there is a z which 'makes up the difference' between them [Yablo] |
| 19001 | 'Pegasus doesn't exist' is false without Pegasus, yet the absence of Pegasus is its truthmaker [Yablo] |
| 19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
| 19002 | A nominalist can assert statements about mathematical objects, as being partly true [Yablo] |
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 18998 | Parthood lacks the restriction of kind which most relations have [Yablo] |
| 19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
| 19004 | Gettier says you don't know if you are confused about how it is true [Yablo] |
| 19007 | A theory need not be true to be good; it should just be true about its physical aspects [Yablo] |
| 18993 | If sentences point to different evidence, they must have different subject-matter [Yablo] |
| 19003 | Most people say nonblack nonravens do confirm 'all ravens are black', but only a tiny bit [Yablo] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
| 19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
| 18992 | Sentence-meaning is the truth-conditions - plus factors responsible for them [Yablo] |
| 19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
| 18994 | The content of an assertion can be quite different from compositional content [Yablo] |
| 18997 | Truth-conditions as subject-matter has problems of relevance, short cut, and reversal [Yablo] |
| 19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
| 19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
| 19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
| 19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
| 19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
| 19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
| 19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
| 19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
| 19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
| 19005 | Not-A is too strong to just erase an improper assertion, because it actually reverses A [Yablo] |