Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Good and Evil', 'The Intentional Fallacy' and 'Persistence, Change and Explanation'

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15 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]