83 ideas
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |