54 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |