16 ideas
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
18889 | Ostensive definitions needn't involve pointing, but must refer to something specific [Salmon,N] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
14627 | S4, and therefore S5, are invalid for metaphysical modality [Salmon,N, by Williamson] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
18888 | Essentialism says some properties must be possessed, if a thing is to exist [Salmon,N] |
18886 | Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N] |
18887 | The perfect case of direct reference is a variable which has been assigned a value [Salmon,N] |
18891 | Nothing in the direct theory of reference blocks anti-essentialism; water structure might have been different [Salmon,N] |