14 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |