14 ideas
14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
21750 | Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine] |
14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
21748 | More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine] |
21749 | Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine] |
21751 | Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine] |