12 ideas
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 10242 | I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine] |
| 10243 | My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |