14 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 22293 | Hilbert said (to block paradoxes) that mathematical existence is entailed by consistency [Hilbert, by Potter] |
| 8361 | What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv] |
| 8363 | p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv] |
| 8364 | We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv] |
| 8366 | The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv] |
| 8362 | We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv] |
| 8360 | We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv] |
| 8365 | Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv] |