10 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
5692 | Introspection is not perception, because there are no extra qualities apart from the mental events themselves [Rosenthal] |