Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'The Tragedy of Reason' and 'Against the Logicians (two books)'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]