61 ideas
23183 | Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche] |
23188 | Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
23212 | A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche] |
23199 | What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche] |
23202 | Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
23196 | Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
23186 | Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
23211 | Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche] |
23201 | The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche] |
23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
23197 | Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche] |
23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
23209 | Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche] |
23184 | The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche] |
23190 | Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche] |
23191 | Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche] |
23213 | The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche] |
23210 | That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
23189 | Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche] |
23192 | Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
23187 | Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
23205 | Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche] |
23198 | Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche] |
23208 | Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche] |
23193 | Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche] |
23214 | For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche] |
23203 | The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche] |
23200 | The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche] |
23194 | People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche] |
23204 | To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche] |
23195 | Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche] |
23185 | In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche] |