55 ideas
125 | Is a gifted philosopher unmanly if he avoids the strife of the communal world? [Plato] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
4321 | We should test one another, by asking and answering questions [Plato] |
1654 | In "Gorgias" Socrates is confident that his 'elenchus' will decide moral truth [Vlastos on Plato] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
116 | Rhetoric is irrational about its means and its ends [Plato] |
114 | Rhetoric can produce conviction, but not educate people about right and wrong [Plato] |
135 | All activity aims at the good [Plato] |
122 | Moral rules are made by the weak members of humanity [Plato] |
139 | A good person is bound to act well, and this brings happiness [Plato] |
128 | Is it natural to simply indulge our selfish desires? [Plato] |
4322 | In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato] |
136 | Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato] |
134 | Good and bad people seem to experience equal amounts of pleasure and pain [Plato] |
4319 | In a fool's mind desire is like a leaky jar, insatiable in its desires, and order and contentment are better [Plato] |
132 | If happiness is the satisfaction of desires, then a life of scratching itches should be happiness [Plato] |
130 | Is the happiest state one of sensual, self-indulgent freedom? [Plato] |
120 | Should we avoid evil because it will bring us bad consequences? [Plato] |
118 | I would rather be a victim of crime than a criminal [Plato] |
140 | Self-indulgent desire makes friendship impossible, because it makes a person incapable of co-operation [Plato] |
131 | If absence of desire is happiness, then nothing is happier than a stone or a corpse [Plato] |
119 | A criminal is worse off if he avoids punishment [Plato] |
129 | Do most people praise self-discipline and justice because they are too timid to gain their own pleasure? [Plato] |
4320 | The popular view is that health is first, good looks second, and honest wealth third [Plato] |
137 | As with other things, a good state is organised and orderly [Plato] |
141 | A good citizen won't be passive, but will redirect the needs of the state [Plato] |
123 | Do most people like equality because they are second-rate? [Plato] |
124 | Does nature imply that it is right for better people to have greater benefits? [Plato] |