16 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
| 12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |