13 ideas
| 19426 | 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics [Leibniz] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
| 18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
| 19424 | Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive [Leibniz] |
| 19427 | True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions [Leibniz] |
| 19425 | In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way [Leibniz] |