Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference' and 'Mental Files in Flux'

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
22246 A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
13373 Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
13368 The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
13370 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
13369 By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
13366 The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
13367 The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
13371 If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
13372 There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22247 Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati]
22248 How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
22242 Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati]
22243 The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
22245 A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
22250 There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
22249 The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati]