36 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
14703 | Superficial necessity is true in all worlds; deep necessity is thus true, no matter which world is actual [Schroeter] |
14714 | Contradictory claims about a necessary god both seem apriori coherent [Schroeter] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
14704 | 2D semantics gives us apriori knowledge of our own meanings [Schroeter] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
14706 | Your view of water depends on whether you start from the actual Earth or its counterfactual Twin [Schroeter] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |
14717 | Internalist meaning is about understanding; externalist meaning is about embedding in a situation [Schroeter] |
14720 | Semantic theory assigns meanings to expressions, and metasemantics explains how this works [Schroeter] |
14695 | Semantic theories show how truth of sentences depends on rules for interpreting and joining their parts [Schroeter] |
14696 | Simple semantics assigns extensions to names and to predicates [Schroeter] |
14697 | 'Federer' and 'best tennis player' can't mean the same, despite having the same extension [Schroeter] |
14698 | Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter] |
14699 | Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter] |
14709 | Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter] |
14719 | In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter] |
14701 | Array worlds along the horizontal, and contexts (world,person,time) along the vertical [Schroeter] |
14702 | If we introduce 'actually' into modal talk, we need possible worlds twice to express this [Schroeter] |
14705 | Do we know apriori how we refer to names and natural kinds, but their modal profiles only a posteriori? [Schroeter] |
14715 | 2D fans defend it for conceptual analysis, for meaning, and for internalist reference [Schroeter] |
14716 | 2D semantics can't respond to contingent apriori claims, since there is no single proposition involved [Schroeter] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |