16 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |