14 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
| 2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
| 2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |