Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'works' and 'On the Individuation of Attributes'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
18441 No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
18440 Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
15473 How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2981 Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2985 Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
3135 Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
2983 Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]