76 ideas
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |