15 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 8679 | We perceive the objects of set theory, just as we perceive with our senses [Gödel] |
| 9942 | Gödel proved the classical relative consistency of the axiom V = L [Gödel, by Putnam] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 18062 | Set-theory paradoxes are no worse than sense deception in physics [Gödel] |
| 10868 | The Continuum Hypothesis is not inconsistent with the axioms of set theory [Gödel, by Clegg] |
| 13517 | If set theory is consistent, we cannot refute or prove the Continuum Hypothesis [Gödel, by Hart,WD] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 10271 | Basic mathematics is related to abstract elements of our empirical ideas [Gödel] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |