12 ideas
7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
14082 | No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |