18 ideas
10882 | Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
10884 | A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
10885 | Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
10881 | The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |