96 ideas
20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
16841 | Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton] |
16854 | Contrary pairs entail contradictions; one member entails negation of the other [Lipton] |
20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
16814 | Understanding is not mysterious - it is just more knowledge, of causes [Lipton] |
20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
16825 | How do we distinguish negative from irrelevant evidence, if both match the hypothesis? [Lipton] |
20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
16851 | The inference to observables and unobservables is almost the same, so why distinguish them? [Lipton] |
16799 | Inductive inference is not proof, but weighing evidence and probability [Lipton] |
16798 | We infer from evidence by working out what would explain that evidence [Lipton] |
16856 | It is more impressive that relativity predicted Mercury's orbit than if it had accommodated it [Lipton] |
16857 | Predictions are best for finding explanations, because mere accommodations can be fudged [Lipton] |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
16804 | Induction is repetition, instances, deduction, probability or causation [Lipton] |
16823 | Standard induction does not allow for vertical inferences, to some unobservable lower level [Lipton] |
16800 | An inductive inference is underdetermined, by definition [Lipton] |
16858 | We can argue to support our beliefs, so induction will support induction, for believers in induction [Lipton] |
16832 | If something in ravens makes them black, it may be essential (definitive of ravens) [Lipton] |
16836 | My shoes are not white because they lack some black essence of ravens [Lipton] |
16831 | A theory may explain the blackness of a raven, but say nothing about the whiteness of shoes [Lipton] |
16833 | We can't turn non-black non-ravens into ravens, to test the theory [Lipton] |
16834 | To pick a suitable contrast to ravens, we need a hypothesis about their genes [Lipton] |
16802 | Bayes seems to rule out prior evidence, since that has a probability of one [Lipton] |
16803 | Bayes is too liberal, since any logical consequence of a hypothesis confirms it [Lipton] |
16801 | A hypothesis is confirmed if an unlikely prediction comes true [Lipton] |
16837 | Bayes involves 'prior' probabilities, 'likelihood', 'posterior' probability, and 'conditionalising' [Lipton] |
16839 | Explanation may be an important part of implementing Bayes's Theorem [Lipton] |
16850 | Explanation may describe induction, but may not show how it justifies, or leads to truth [Lipton] |
16807 | An explanation gives the reason the phenomenon occurred [Lipton] |
16808 | An explanation is what makes the unfamiliar familiar to us [Lipton] |
16806 | An explanation is what is added to knowledge to yield understanding [Lipton] |
16822 | Seaching for explanations is a good way to discover the structure of the world [Lipton] |
16816 | In 'contrastive' explanation there is a fact and a foil - why that fact, rather than this foil? [Lipton] |
16826 | With too many causes, find a suitable 'foil' for contrast, and the field narrows right down [Lipton] |
16811 | An explanation unifies a phenomenon with our account of other phenomena [Lipton] |
16810 | Deduction explanation is too easy; any law at all will imply the facts - together with the facts! [Lipton] |
16829 | We reject deductive explanations if they don't explain, not if the deduction is bad [Lipton] |
16809 | Good explanations may involve no laws and no deductions [Lipton] |
16812 | An explanation shows why it was necessary that the effect occurred [Lipton] |
16846 | A cause may not be an explanation [Lipton] |
16813 | To explain is to give either the causal history, or the causal mechanism [Lipton] |
16815 | Mathematical and philosophical explanations are not causal [Lipton] |
16849 | Explanations may be easier to find than causes [Lipton] |
16848 | Causal inferences are clearest when we can manipulate things [Lipton] |
16842 | We want to know not just the cause, but how the cause operated [Lipton] |
16840 | To maximise probability, don't go beyond your data [Lipton] |
16824 | Is Inference to the Best Explanation nothing more than inferring the likeliest cause? [Lipton] |
16817 | Best Explanation as a guide to inference is preferable to best standard explanations [Lipton] |
16818 | The 'likeliest' explanation is the best supported; the 'loveliest' gives the most understanding [Lipton] |
16819 | IBE is inferring that the best potential explanation is the actual explanation [Lipton] |
16820 | Finding the 'loveliest' potential explanation links truth to understanding [Lipton] |
16828 | IBE is not passive treatment of data, but involves feedback between theory and data search [Lipton] |
16844 | A contrasting difference is the cause if it offers the best explanation [Lipton] |
16853 | We select possible explanations for explanatory reasons, as well as choosing among them [Lipton] |
16821 | Must we only have one explanation, and must all the data be made relevant? [Lipton] |
16838 | Bayesians say best explanations build up an incoherent overall position [Lipton] |
16855 | The best theory is boring: compare 'all planets move elliptically' with 'most of them do' [Lipton] |
16852 | Best explanation can't be a guide to truth, because the truth must precede explanation [Lipton] |
20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |