166 ideas
| 2937 | What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence [Wittgenstein] |
| 6870 | I say (contrary to Wittgenstein) that philosophy expresses what we thought we must be silent about [Ansell Pearson on Wittgenstein] |
| 2944 | If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it [Wittgenstein] |
| 9810 | The 'Tractatus' is a masterpiece of anti-philosophy [Badiou on Wittgenstein] |
| 23459 | This work solves all the main problems, but that has little value [Wittgenstein] |
| 23512 | Once you understand my book you will see that it is nonsensical [Wittgenstein] |
| 2938 | The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein] |
| 6429 | All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein] |
| 23492 | Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein] |
| 23510 | Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 23499 | This book says we should either say it clearly, or shut up [Wittgenstein] |
| 23508 | Science is all the true propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 2939 | If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein] |
| 10910 | The best account of truth-making is isomorphism [Wittgenstein, by Mulligan/Simons/Smith] |
| 23462 | He says the world is the facts because it is the facts which fix all the truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 18349 | All truths have truth-makers, but only atomic truths correspond to them [Wittgenstein, by Rami] |
| 10967 | Wittgenstein's picture theory is the best version of the correspondence theory of truth [Read on Wittgenstein] |
| 7087 | Language is [propositions-elementary propositions-names]; reality is [facts-states of affairs-objects] [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 4702 | The account of truth in the 'Tractatus' seems a perfect example of the correspondence theory [Wittgenstein, by O'Grady] |
| 7056 | Pictures reach out to or feel reality, touching at the edges, correlating in its parts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 23502 | Logic fills the world, to its limits [Wittgenstein] |
| 23504 | Logic concerns everything that is subject to law; the rest is accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 6428 | Wittgenstein is right that logic is just tautologies [Wittgenstein, by Russell] |
| 11062 | Logic is a priori because it is impossible to think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 18277 | If q implies p, that is justified by q and p, not by some 'laws' of inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 18162 | The propositions of logic are analytic tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 7537 | Wittgenstein convinced Russell that logic is tautologies, not Platonic forms [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 23496 | Two colours in the same place is ruled out by the logical structure of colour [Wittgenstein] |
| 18154 | The sign of identity is not allowed in 'Tractatus' [Wittgenstein, by Bostock] |
| 13429 | The identity sign is not essential in logical notation, if every sign has a different meaning [Wittgenstein, by Ramsey] |
| 18268 | Apparent logical form may not be real logical form [Wittgenstein] |
| 10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
| 23493 | 'Not' isn't an object, because not-not-p would then differ from p [Wittgenstein] |
| 7784 | 'Object' is a pseudo-concept, properly indicated in logic by the variable x [Wittgenstein] |
| 23506 | Names are primitive, and cannot be analysed [Wittgenstein] |
| 7089 | A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein] |
| 3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars [Rey] |
| 9467 | Wittgenstein tried unsuccessfully to reduce quantifiers to conjunctions and disjunctions [Wittgenstein, by Jacquette] |
| 15089 | Logical proof just explicates complicated tautologies [Wittgenstein] |
| 13830 | Logical truths are just 'by-products' of the introduction rules for logical constants [Wittgenstein, by Hacking] |
| 19292 | Logic doesn't split into primitive and derived propositions; they all have the same status [Wittgenstein] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 18153 | A number is a repeated operation [Wittgenstein] |
| 18160 | The concept of number is just what all numbers have in common [Wittgenstein] |
| 18161 | The theory of classes is superfluous in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic [Rey] |
| 6849 | Wittgenstein hated logicism, and described it as a cancerous growth [Wittgenstein, by Monk] |
| 23509 | The logic of the world is shown by tautologies in logic, and by equations in mathematics [Wittgenstein] |
| 13133 | The world is facts, not things. Facts determine the world, and the world divides into facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 7090 | The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 23464 | In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein] |
| 23471 | The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein] |
| 21682 | If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein] |
| 22319 | Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein] |
| 21683 | Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 23473 | Do his existent facts constitute the world, or determine the world? [Morris,M on Wittgenstein] |
| 22311 | The world is determined by the facts, and there are no further facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 22313 | The existence of atomic facts is a positive fact, their non-existence a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 22314 | On white paper a black spot is a positive fact and a white spot a negative fact [Wittgenstein] |
| 7969 | The order of numbers is an internal relation, not an external one [Wittgenstein] |
| 7968 | A relation is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it [Wittgenstein] |
| 23466 | Objects are the substance of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23467 | Objects are simple [Wittgenstein] |
| 23468 | Apart from the facts, there is only substance [Wittgenstein] |
| 22321 | To know an object we must know the form and content of its internal properties [Wittgenstein, by Potter] |
| 6056 | Identity is not a relation between objects [Wittgenstein] |
| 22322 | You can't define identity by same predicates, because two objects with same predicates is assertable [Wittgenstein] |
| 6057 | Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein] |
| 3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds [Rey] |
| 9442 | The only necessity is logical necessity [Wittgenstein] |
| 23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 23487 | What is thinkable is possible [Wittgenstein] |
| 23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 23507 | Unlike the modern view of a set of worlds, Wittgenstein thinks of a structured manifold of them [Wittgenstein, by White,RM] |
| 23469 | An imagined world must have something in common with the real world [Wittgenstein] |
| 11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
| 23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
| 12869 | Two objects may only differ in being different [Wittgenstein] |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| 16907 | If the truth doesn't follow from self-evidence, then self-evidence cannot justify a truth [Wittgenstein] |
| 23479 | The Tractatus aims to reveal the necessities, without appealing to synthetic a priori truths [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 23501 | There is no a priori order of things [Wittgenstein] |
| 7088 | Logic and maths can't say anything about the world, since, as tautologies, they are consistent with all realities [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 16909 | Logic is a priori because we cannot think illogically [Wittgenstein] |
| 23485 | No pictures are true a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge [Rey] |
| 3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour [Rey] |
| 6591 | Doubts can't exist if they are inexpressible or unanswerable [Wittgenstein] |
| 17665 | The 'Tractatus' is instrumentalist about laws of nature [Wittgenstein, by Armstrong] |
| 2941 | Induction accepts the simplest law that fits our experiences [Wittgenstein] |
| 17673 | The modern worldview is based on the illusion that laws explain nature [Wittgenstein] |
| 3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned [Rey] |
| 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere [Rey] |
| 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
| 3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? [Rey] |
| 3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach [Rey] |
| 3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular [Rey] |
| 3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey] |
| 3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey] |
| 3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion [Rey] |
| 2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality [Rey] |
| 3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives [Rey] |
| 3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious [Rey] |
| 23498 | The modern idea of the subjective soul is composite, and impossible [Wittgenstein] |
| 3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' [Rey] |
| 3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will [Rey] |
| 3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group [Rey] |
| 3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological [Rey] |
| 3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey] |
| 3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey] |
| 3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey] |
| 3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
| 3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
| 3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes [Rey] |
| 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? [Rey] |
| 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part [Rey] |
| 3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
| 3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey] |
| 3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey] |
| 3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism [Rey] |
| 3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' [Rey] |
| 3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well [Rey] |
| 3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes [Rey] |
| 3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? [Rey] |
| 3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance [Rey] |
| 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey] |
| 23475 | The form of a proposition must show why nonsense is unjudgeable [Wittgenstein] |
| 3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli [Rey] |
| 3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar [Rey] |
| 3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar [Rey] |
| 3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought [Rey] |
| 3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it [Rey] |
| 3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason [Rey] |
| 3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey] |
| 3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey] |
| 3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
| 3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
| 7084 | What can be said is what can be thought, so language shows the limits of thought [Wittgenstein, by Grayling] |
| 23482 | The 'form' of the picture is its possible combinations [Wittgenstein] |
| 8172 | To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true [Wittgenstein] |
| 7086 | Good philosophy asserts science, and demonstrates the meaninglessness of metaphysics [Wittgenstein] |
| 3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
| 3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
| 3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
| 3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers [Rey] |
| 3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning [Rey] |
| 3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') [Rey] |
| 23511 | Propositions use old expressions for a new sense [Wittgenstein] |
| 23488 | Propositions are understood via their constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 23486 | Pictures are possible situations in logical space [Wittgenstein] |
| 23497 | Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein] |
| 3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' [Rey] |
| 23489 | We translate by means of proposition constituents, not by whole propositions [Wittgenstein] |
| 2943 | Ethics cannot be put into words [Wittgenstein] |
| 2942 | The sense of the world must lie outside the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires [Rey] |