Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Reference and Essence: seven appendices' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
14742 It can't be indeterminate whether x and y are identical; if x,y is indeterminate, then it isn't x,x [Salmon,N]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
18885 Kripke and Putnam made false claims that direct reference implies essentialism [Salmon,N]