24 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
14239 | The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley] |
14240 | The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley] |
14241 | We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley] |
14242 | Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley] |
14243 | The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley] |
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
14245 | Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley] |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
14246 | If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
14247 | Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley] |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |