Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Abstraction Reconsidered' and 'Armstrong on combinatorial possibility'

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
10735 Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
10732 If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
10731 For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
10733 The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
10734 Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]