17 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
| 10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
| 10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
| 10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |