Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Action'

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24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
22449 When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
22451 All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
22452 Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]