Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity' and 'Proslogion'

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23 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
21244 Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm]
21241 Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm]
21242 If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm]
1421 A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm]
21245 The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm]
21246 Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm]
21247 Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm]
21243 An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
1420 Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm]