20 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |