Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Empty Names' and 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value'

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
18935 Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
18934 Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
18938 Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
18947 Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18228 An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
18225 If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
18224 Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
18233 Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
18226 For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]