16 ideas
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 18935 | Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer] |
| 18945 | Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer] |
| 18934 | Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer] |
| 18938 | Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer] |
| 18947 | Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
| 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
| 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
| 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
| 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |