Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Question of Absolute Undecidability', 'Identity and Necessity' and 'Chemistry'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
17884 Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner]
17893 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
17894 We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
17890 There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17887 PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
17891 Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17486 Supervenience is simply modally robust property co-variance [Hendry]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
17481 Nuclear charge (plus laws) explains electron structure and spectrum, but not vice versa [Hendry]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
17478 Maybe two kinds are the same if there is no change of entropy on isothermal mixing [Hendry]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
17484 Maybe the nature of water is macroscopic, and not in the microstructure [Hendry]
17479 The nature of an element must survive chemical change, so it is the nucleus, not the electrons [Hendry]
17485 Maybe water is the smallest part of it that still counts as water (which is H2O molecules) [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
17482 Compounds can differ with the same collection of atoms, so structure matters too [Hendry]
17483 Water continuously changes, with new groupings of molecules [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
17476 Elements survive chemical change, and are tracked to explain direction and properties [Hendry]
17477 Defining elements by atomic number allowed atoms of an element to have different masses [Hendry]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
17480 Generally it is nuclear charge (not nuclear mass) which determines behaviour [Hendry]