22 ideas
17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
9175 | We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke] |
9171 | The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke] |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
9174 | It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke] |
9172 | A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
9173 | We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke] |
9176 | Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
9178 | Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke] |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |