41 ideas
| 7578 | I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard] |
| 22047 | Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard] |
| 23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
| 23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
| 22092 | Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
| 15999 | Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard] |
| 20313 | The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard] |
| 17884 | Mathematical set theory has many plausible stopping points, such as finitism, and predicativism [Koellner] |
| 17893 | 'Reflection principles' say the whole truth about sets can't be captured [Koellner] |
| 17894 | We have no argument to show a statement is absolutely undecidable [Koellner] |
| 17890 | There are at least eleven types of large cardinal, of increasing logical strength [Koellner] |
| 17887 | PA is consistent as far as we can accept, and we expand axioms to overcome limitations [Koellner] |
| 17891 | Arithmetical undecidability is always settled at the next stage up [Koellner] |
| 20742 | The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard] |
| 23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
| 23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
| 23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
| 23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
| 23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
| 23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
| 23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
| 23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
| 23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
| 23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
| 23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
| 23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
| 23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
| 23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
| 23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
| 23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
| 23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
| 23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
| 7579 | While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard] |
| 7581 | Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard] |
| 20314 | People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard] |
| 7582 | Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard] |
| 7586 | God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard] |
| 20312 | God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard] |
| 7580 | Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard] |
| 7583 | Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard] |
| 7584 | Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard] |